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In this paper we import a mainstream psycholgical theory, known as attachment 
theory, into economics and show the implications of this theory for economic 
behavior by individuals in the ultimatum bargaining game. Attachment theory 
examines the psychological tendency to seek proximity to another person, to feel 
secure when that person is present, and to feel anxious when that person is absent. An 
individual's attachment style can be classified along two-dimensional axes, one 
representing attachment "avoidance" and one representing attachment "anxiety". 
Avoidant people generally feel discomfort when being close to others, have trouble 
trusting people and distance themselves from intimate or revealing situations. 
Anxious people have a fear of abandonment and of not being loved. Utilizing 
attachment theory, we evaluate the connection between attachment types and 
economic decision making, and find that in an Ultimatum Game both proposers' and 
responders' behavior can be explained by their attachment styles, as explained by the 
theory. We believe this theory has implications for economic behavior in different 
settings, such as negotiations, in general, and more specifically, may help explain 
behavior, and perhaps even anomalies, in other experimental settings.   
 
JEL Classification Codes: C91, C78 
Keywords: Attachment Theory, Experimental Economics, Behavioral Economics, 
Ultimatum Game, Psychology and Economics. 
 Introduction 
In this paper we import a mainstream psycholgical theory, known as attachment 
theory, into economics and show the implications of this theory for economic 
behavior by individuals in certain settings. We test these implications by appealing to 
the much researched Ultimatum Game, and demonstrate the ability of the theory to  
help explain some of the differing behavior across individuals in this game.  
Attachment theory is meant to describe and explain people's enduring patterns of 
relationships from birth to death. This domain overlaps considerably with that of 
Interpersonal Theory. Because attachment is thought to have an evolutionary basis, 
attachment theory is also related to Evolutionary Psychology.   
Bowlby (1969), who first applied this idea to the infant-caregiver bond, was inspired 
by studies from ethology.  Ethology is concerned with the adaptive or survival value 
of behavior and its evolutionary history. It was first applied to research on children in 
the 1960s, but has become more influential in recent years. Bowlby created an 
alternative to psychoanalytic theory, one much more solidly grounded in primate 
ethology, cognitive developmental psychology, and clinical research. Basically, 
attachment theory is a theory of personality and social behavior. 
Today, because of this auspicious theoretical and psychometric foundation, 
attachment theory has spawned a large and complex literature comprising thousands 
of empirical studies, a literature that continues to reflect Bowlby’s psychoanalytic 
origins. As a personality theory, attachment theory combines psychoanalytic, 
evolutionary, developmental, social-cognitive, and trait-like constructs in a systematic 
framework that transcends the usual typologies of personality theories. Still, the 
subheadings used in textbooks that systematically compare personality theories – 
structure, motivation, dynamics, individual differences, development, and mental 
health or optimal adjustment – are useful in organizing and explaining attachment 
theory and its research literature.  
The paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews attachment theory as 
developed in the psychology literature. Section 2 presents a short exposition of the 
Ultimatum Game and presents some literature on how personal traits affect behavior 
in the Ultimatum Game. Section 3 provides the experimental design and the 
hypotheses. Section 4 contains the results and the analyses. A brief summary and 
discussion can be found in Section 5.   2
 
1. Introduction to Attachment Theory  
Attachment theory was first suggested by Bowlby (1969, 1973, 1980, 1988) to help 
explain the emotional connection that is formed between infants and their caregivers. 
This connection, called attachment style, is credited with assisting the infant's survival 
during times of stress or threat. Different modes of communication evolve over time 
to assist in creating this attachment system. According to Bowlby, the attachment 
system is activated through the answer to the following fundamental question: Is the 
attachment figure nearby, accessible and attentive? If the child perceives the answer 
to this question to be "yes," he or she feels loved, secure, and confident, and, 
behaviorally, is likely to explore his or her environment, play with others, and be 
sociable. If, however, the child perceives the answer to this question to be "no," the 
child experiences anxiety, and, behaviorally, is likely to exhibit attachment behaviors 
ranging from simple visual search to active search expressed by crawling and crying 
in an attempt to find the attachment figure. 
Although Bowlby believed that the basic dynamics described above captured the 
normative dynamics of the attachment behavioral system, he recognized that there 
were individual differences in the way children appraised the accessibility of the 
attachment figure and how they regulated their attachment behavior in response to a 
threat. However, it wasn't until his colleague, Mary Ainsworth, began to 
systematically study infant-parent separations that a formal understanding of these 
individual differences came to fruition. Ainsworth and her students developed a 
technique called "the stranger situation." In this technique, 12-month-old infants and 
their parents were brought to the laboratory and were systematically separated (and 
replaced by a stranger) and reunited. In "the stranger situation," most children (about 
60%) behaved in accordance with Bowlby's "normative" theory. They became upset 
when the parent left the room, but when he or she returned, they actively sought the 
parent and were easily comforted by him or her. Children who exhibit this pattern of 
behavior are often called secure. Other children (about 20% or less) are 
uncomfortable initially (perhaps because of the new surroundings), and, upon 
separation, become extremely distressed. When reunited with their parents, these 
children often exhibit conflicting behaviors that suggest that on the one hand they 
want to be comforted, but on the other hand, they also want to "punish" the parent for   3
leaving. These children are often called anxious-ambivalent. The third pattern of 
attachment that Ainsworth and her colleagues documented is called avoidant. 
Avoidant children (about 20%) don't appear too distressed by the separation, and, 
upon reunion, avoid seeking contact with their parent, sometimes even turning their 
attention to play-objects on the floor. 
To sum up, at least three types of children exist: those who are secure in their 
relationship with their parents, those who are anxious-ambivalent, and those who are 
avoidant.
1 These individual differences are correlated with infant-parent interactions 
in the home during the first year of life. Children who appear secure in the "stranger 
situation," for example, tend to have parents who are responsive to their needs. 
Children who appear insecure in the stranger situation often have parents who are 
insensitive to their needs or inconsistent or rejecting in the care they provide. 
Although Bowlby primarily focused on understanding the nature of the infant-
caregiver relationship, he believed that attachment characterizes human experience in 
all stages of life. Attachment styles in adults are thought to stem directly from the 
working models (or mental models) of the self and other, which were developed 
during infancy and childhood. The dynamics of the attachment system develop during 
a life span by social interactions with attachment figures, eventually resulting in fairly 
stable individual differences in mental representations of past attachment experiences 
(Fraley and Shaver, 2000).    
Hazan and Shaver (1987, 1994) were two of the first researchers to explore Bowlby's 
ideas in the context of adult romantic relationships. According to Hazan and Shaver, 
the emotional bond that develops between adult romantic partners is partly a function 
of the attachment behavioral system that gives rise to the emotional bond between 
infants and their caregivers. They argue that attachment theory provides not only a 
framework for understanding emotional reactions in infants, but also a framework for 
understanding love, loneliness, and social interactions in adults. On the basis of these 
parallels, Hazan and Shaver argue that during adolescence, a new way of approaching 
attachment is formed. This new form of attachment is predictive of attachment 
                                                  
1 In several studies, it was noted that many infants did not fall into any of the original three categories 
previously described. A fourth attachment pattern has been proposed in order to describe infants who 
displayed a pronounced mixture of ambivalent and avoidant patterns of behavior. This style is the 
"disorganized" attachment style. 
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behavior in future life, such as with one's own kids or in marital relationships. It has 
to be remembered though, that the relationship between parents and children does not 
become less important during adolescence; the adolescent just becomes less 
dependent on the parents.  
Hazan and Shaver (1987) designed a self report questionnaire composed of questions 
relating to interpersonal beliefs and expectations from attachment figures. 
Respondants were asked to choose which interpersonal expectation best fit their own 
interpersonal relationships. The "secure" person was described as someone who 
develops close relationships relatively easily, is comfortable with the mutual 
dependence that accompanies such a relationship, is not anxious about separation or 
abandonment and tends to be more satisfied in his relationships than insecure adults. 
The "avoidant" person was described as someone who feels discomfort when close to 
someone, has trouble trusting that person, and has a feeling that others have more 
interesting and intimate relationships than he has. The "anxious-ambivalent" person 
was described as someone with fears of abandonment or of not being loved, while at 
the same time having an urge to develop a tight relationship with their significant 
other.  
Initially, adult attachment research was based on Ainsworth et al.'s (1978) three 
category typology of attachment styles in infancy – secure, anxious and avoidant – 
and Hazan and Shaver's (1987) conceptualization of similar adult styles in the domain 
of romantic relationships. Subsequent studies (e.g., Bartholomew and Horowitz, 1991; 
Brennan et al., 1998) indicated that attachment styles are more appropriately 
conceptualized as regions in a continuous two-dimensional space (Figure 1). 
One dimension has been labeled attachment anxiety. People who score high in this 
dimension tend to worry whether their partner is available, responsive and attentive. 
People who score in the low range of this dimension are more secure in the 
responsiveness of their partners. The other dimension is called attachment avoidance. 
People on the high end of this dimension prefer not to rely on others or open up to 
others. They strive to maintain behavioral independence and emotional distance from 
partners. People on the low end of this dimension are more comfortable being 
intimate with others and are more secure depending upon others and being depended 
upon. A prototypical secure adult is low on both of these dimensions.    5
These dimensions create a space within which an individual's attachment tendency 
can be represented. In the secure region both anxiety and avoidance are low. In the 
preoccupied region (referred to later on as the "anxious" region) anxiety is high and 
avoidance is low. In the avoidance region, obviously, avoidance is high. 
The use of attachment theory allows us to define a different framework for 
understanding certain aspects of individual behavior. In this paper we use attachment 
theory to examine the connection between attachment types and economic decision 
making in the Ultimatum Game. 
 
2. The Ultimatum Game  
The Ultimatum Game is one of the most extensively studied games in experimental 
labs. This is a two-player bargaining game: the first player (the proposer) makes a 
proposal of how to divide a certain sum of money with another player, who has the 
option to accept or reject the proposed division. If the second player (the responder) 
accepts the offer, each player gets his agreed share of the pie. If the responder rejects 
the offer, each player earns zero.  
In this paper, we use attachment theory to tackle the questions of why proposers offer 
high shares of their endowment and why responders reject a substantial proportion of 
the offers. The Ultimatum Game naturally involves situations of negative and positive 
reciprocity, and of certainty and uncertainty, all crucial variables in attachment theory. 
In much of the literature, the behavior of subjects in the Ultimatum Game is partially 
explained by social preferences or other regarding behavior. In this work, we extend 
this trend, and show that an individual's attachment style can be instructive in 
understanding his behavior in the Ultimatum Game.  
Classifying the players according to their attachment types, we find that insecure 
types react in different ways to the game. As proposers, anxiously attached 
individuals send a high proportion of their endowment, while avoidant individuals 
send a low proportion, i.e., we find a positive correlation between offer and anxiety, 
and a negative correlation between avoidance and offer. Analyzing the behavior of the 
responders, we found a positive correlation between anxiety and the acceptance rate, 
and a negative, but not statistically significant, relationship between avoidance and 
the acceptance rate.   6
 
2.1 Relevant Literature Review 
The Ultimatum Game was initially presented in Güth et al. (1982). Assuming players' 
utility is monotonically increasing in their monetary payoffs and that they care about 
their own payoffs and not those of their opponents, game theory predicts that 
proposers should offer zero or the smallest non-zero amount possible, and responders 
should accept (if the offer is zero, the responder should be indifferent between 
accepting and rejecting). The data are inconsistent with both of these predictions; 
proposers tend to offer amounts higher than the minimum, and responders tend to 
reject if offered a relatively small share. In their experiment, Güth et al. (1982) find 
that for both experienced and inexperienced players the mean offer was about 37% of 
the "pie," which is significantly more than the epsilon predicted by the subgame 
perfect equilibrium, and low offers were often rejected. In the replication, after a week 
to think about it, first players' offers decreased (the mean offer was 32%), but still 
were significantly higher than epsilon. As a result, there was an even higher rate of 
rejection by the responders, (but higher payoffs to the proposers whose low offers 
were accepted by responders). While for proposers such behavior can be "rationally" 
justified (since they have to consider "irrational" behavior on the part of responders), 
for responders justification within the strict confines of standard economic theory is 
more elusive. 
These results have since been replicated in many different settings and with various 
nuances, and various explanations for the findings have been given. Many authors 
altered the precise setting, and demonstrated how different setups can affect the 
results, but the basic results have been shown to be quite resilient to structural 
changes. These early studies differentiated between different experimental designs, 
but not between people.  
In a pioneering study, Roth et al. (1991) suggested that cultural differences could 
affect the way in which the game is played, and proceeded to run the Ultimatum 
Game in Jerusalem, Ljubljana, Pittsburgh, and Tokyo, being careful to keep things as 
similar as possible in all locations. They show that the distribution of offers was 
significantly different in different countries. In the U.S. and Slovenia, the modal offer 
in the tenth round remained 500 tokens (50%), as in the first round. In Japan, the most   7
frequent offers at the tenth round were between 400 tokens and 450 tokens. In Israel, 
they were 400 tokens. Henrich et al. (2001) conducted the experiment in small 
communities in 15 developing countries, and found even more variation in behavior, 
however, the variation was according to societal characteristics, e.g., the degree of 
market integration or cooperation, and not according to measurable individual socio-
economic characteristics. Oosterbeek et al. (2004) conducted a meta-analysis of 37 
papers covering ultimatum experiments in 25 different countries, and used measures 
of cultural traits to explain the differences across countries. These studies 
demonstrated convincingly that one should not expect identical behavior from people 
with different cultures. They did not, however, differentiate between people with the 
same culture. 
Eckel and Grossman (2001) were the first to investigate whether gender affects play 
in this game. They found that women offer slightly more than men on average 
although the differences were only marginally significant, and are significantly more 
likely to accept unequal splits. An additional important finding is that women are 
perceived to be more egalitarian than men. For a survey of research on gender 
differences and consequences of the perceived differences, see Eckel et al. (2008).  
More in line with our research, Meyer (1992) and Carpenter et al. (2005) included a 
personality scale known as the Mach (Machiavelli) Scale as an explanatory variable in 
the Ultimatum Game. Construction of the Mach Scale is accomplished by posing 20 
statements with which the subject is asked to agree or disagree on a seven-point scale. 
The Mach Scale is meant to capture a person's level of cynicism about others, 
willingness to engage in manipulative behavior and concern about morality. Meyer 
(1992) found that those with high Machs are less likely to reject low offers. Carpenter 
et al. (2005) found no evidence that the Mach Score has an effect on offers (although 
it does have an effect on offers in the Dictator Game). 
Brandstätter and Königstein (2001) examined individual differences in behavior 
within an ultimatum game. The authors found that personality measures contribute 
significantly to understanding decisions. High scores on independence and tough-
mindedness are positively correlated with proposer demands. For responders, people 
who are either emotionally unstable and extraverted or emotionally stable and 
introverted reject more often, which is interpreted as an act of angry retaliation 
(negative reciprocity).    8
Swope et al. (2008) classify people by a psychological preference measure known as 
MBTI (Myers-Briggs Type Indicator), and derive testable hypotheses with respect to 
behavior in four experiments including the Ultimatum Game. They are unable to test 
the effect on rejection rates (there were only 4 rejections in 47 observations), but they 
do find an effect of certain traits on offers. Specifically, they show that people who 
are both extroverts and feeling (as opposed to thinking) types make higher offers. 
 
3. Experimental Design and Hypotheses  
We ran a standard Ultimatum Game experiment consisting of 4 sessions of 10 periods 
each, conducted in a computer laboratory in Bar-Ilan University. Eighty four 
undergraduate economics students participated, with each session lasting about 45 
minutes. Before the beginning of the session subjects were given the instructions of 
the game, and asked to fill out a questionnaire that verified that they understood the 
instructions. Subjects' roles (proposer or responder) were determined randomly before 
the first round of play and remained constant through all rounds. Players were 
matched randomly and then rematched randomly after each round in order to preserve 
the one-shot property of the Ultimatum Game. All participants received a 20 NIS 
(New Israeli Shekels, approximately $5, close to the hourly minimum wage) show-up 
fee and, in addition, the proposers received 50 NIS which they could allocate as they 
saw fit between them and the responders. After each round of play, subjects were 
informed of the outcome. Subjects were given record sheets on which they could 
record their outcomes. At the end of the experiment, one of the rounds was chosen 
randomly, and the payment to the subjects was determined based on their 
performance in this round. While the payoffs were calculated and prepared (paid in 
cash), the subjects filled out an ECR questionnaire, a 36-item self report attachment 
measure developed by Brennan et al. (replicated in the Appendix). The levels of 
avoidance and anxiety were measured from this questionnaire; avoidance is calculated 
as the average of the answers to the odd-numbered questions on the ECR 
questionnaire, and anxiety is measured as the average of the answers to the even 
questions on the ECR questionnaire.
2 
                                                  
2 Professor Mikulincer has notified us that based on thousands of questionnaires he has reviewed, the 
average levels of anxiety and avoidance in the population are approximately 3.   9
Participating in the Ultimatum bargaining game is a stressful task. The proposer faces 
uncertainty: will his offer be accepted? What offer will yield the highest (expected) 
payoff? The responder faces ex-ante (but not ex-post) uncertainty as well, since he 
does not know what the allocated sum will be. Those feelings of uncertainty, 
combined with the interaction with another (anonymous) player, can lead to 
individual differences through attachment styles. The hypotheses we will be testing 
are: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Attachment anxiety positively correlates with offers on the proposer's 
side.       
Hypothesis 2: Attachment anxiety positively correlates with the acceptance of lower 
offers on the responder's side.       
Explanation of Hypotheses 1 and 2: Anxious individuals strive to fully merge with 
their attachment figure, need constant reassurance of their good behavior 
(appreciation) and long for approval from their surroundings, all of which diverts their 
attention from the goals of fairness, punishment or utility maximization. Therefore, a 
proposer who scores high on the attachment anxiety scale is expected to offer higher 
shares in order to get appreciation from the responder. The anxiously attached 
responder is expected to accept very low offers, so that the proposer will appreciate 
his cooperation.  
 
Hypothesis 3: Attachment avoidance negatively correlates with offers on the 
proposer's side.    
Hypothesis 4: Attachment avoidance negatively correlates with the acceptance of 
lower offers on the responder's side.    
Explanation of Hypotheses 3 and 4: Individuals who score high on attachment 
avoidance activate distancing and self-reliance strategies. The main purpose of these 
subjects is not to activate their attachment system in order not to feel that they are 
being exploited and used, feelings that lead to frustration. High offers create 
dependency on the behavior of the responder that may bear an emotional toll in case 
of a rejection. Avoidant individuals perceive rejection of high offers as a rejection of   10
themselves. In contrast, low offers do not put the proposer in such a vulnerable 
position, because they can explain the rejection as resulting from the low offer. By 
making low offers, they protect themselves from getting hurt. They activate 
distancing strategies in order to prevent a situation where they are dependent on 
someone else, the Ultimatum Game being a good example. Proposers who scored 
high on attachment avoidance are expected to offer lower shares of the total amount: 
higher shares might make them feel gullible and exposed to interactions with the 
responder. Responders who score high on attachment avoidance are expected to reject 
higher offers, again in order not to feel gullible. 
 
It is important to stress that the anonymous setting works against us finding the stated 
effects. Attachment theory deals with situations in which people are in close contact 
with one another. We are extending the theory to include situations of anonymity, and 
we fully expect that any findings would be strengthened in a non-anonymous setting. 
 
4. Results 
4.1. Non-Parametric Tests 
We first present the results in general and then test the relevance of attachment type 
for behavior.  
Figure 2  
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Figure 2 depicts the probability distribution of offers throughout all rounds of the 
experiment. As can be seen, the modal offer was between 16 and 20, and, in fact, 
almost a quarter (103/420) of all offers was exactly 20 (as opposed to only 14% who 
offered an equal split). Twenty is also the median, whereas the mean offer is lower 
(18). This finding is in line with the result in Roth, et al. who found that in Israel the 
modal offer was 40% of the pie (as opposed to 50% in the US and Yugoslavia and 40-
45% in Japan).  
Figure 3 
Rejection rates as a function of the offered amount  
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Figure 3 shows the rejection rates as a function of the offer. The rejection rate 
decreases sharply when offers are higher than 10 (20% of the initial endowment), and 
almost all offers bigger than 20 (40% of the initial endowment) are accepted. No offer 
of more than an even split was rejected. 
Referring back to Figure 1, it is appealing (but problematic, as explained below) to 
divide subjects along each of the axes separately – according to avoidance and 
according to anxiety. To this end, we divide the population (first proposers, then 
responders) into two equal sized groups – those whose index place them below the 
median and those who are above the median – first for anxiety and then for avoidance. 
Of course, there is nothing particularly relevant about the median – Bowlby's theory 
says that there are different attachment styles, but does not say where to draw the line, 
and does not predict an equal number of people in each group.    12
Figure 4 






























Behavior of proposers are presented in Figure 4 and rejection rates for responders are 
presented in Figure 5. A Mann-Whitney test and an Epps-Singleton test both show 
that there is no discernable difference (Hypothesis 1) between high anxiety and low 
anxiety proposers. Responder behavior (Hypothesis 2) is more difficult to assess since 
the offers faced by the individuals are not identical. Nevertheless, we see high anxiety 
people accepting lower offers, although the difference may not be significant. All 
told, low anxiety people rejected 52 of 210 proposals, and high anxiety individuals 
rejected "only" 41 of the 210 proposals.   13
Figure 6 

















































With respect to avoidance levels (Figures 6 and 7), The Mann-Whitney test and Epps-
Singleton test show that proposer behavior is significantly different (p<0.0001). As to 
responder behavior, the difficulty of comparing remains. With respect to the number 
of rejections 57 of 210 proposals are rejected for high avoidance people and only 36 
of 210 for low avoidance people. However, looking at the offers accepted shows a 
more extreme picture. Low avoidance individuals accepted very low offers (an offer 
of 0, an offer of 1, 7 out of 9 offers of 5 and both offers of 8), while high avoidance 
responders rejected all offers below 8, and accepted only 2 of 3 offers of 8. As the   14
theory predicts, high avoidance individuals make low offers (Hypothesis 3) and are 
more likely to reject low offers (Hypothesis 4). 
The problem with these tests is that they are one-dimensional; they do not take into 
account that the fundamental nature of attachment theory is two-dimensional. In fact, 
looking at avoidance or anxiety alone can be misleading, since someone may easily 
have any combination of high/low avoidance and high/low anxiety, as depicted in 
Figure 1. In our experiment, for instance, the correlation between anxiety and 
avoidance among our 84 participants was only 0.11. Thus, we want to strengthen our 
comparison by considering those who are relatively low in anxiety but high in 
avoidance (whom we label dismissing avoidant) and are thus expected to give little 
and reject much, with those who are relatively high in anxiety but low in avoidance 
(whom we label preoccupied), from whom we expect the diametric opposite. For this 
comparison we retained only those who were above the median for one and below the 
median for the other, and discarded all those who were either above the median in 
both or below the median in both.  
Figure 8 
















Figure 8 shows the results for the six proposers who are preoccupied and the eight 
who are dismissing avoidant (see Figure 1). The other 29 proposers were either fearful 
avoidant or secure types. A Mann-Whitney test and an Epps Singleton test both 
clearly show that these individuals play differently (p<0.0001), as predicted by the 
theory.   15
Figure 9 













Among the responders there were ten preoccupied individuals and ten who were 
dismissing avoidant. As seen in Figure 9, the dismissing avoidant individuals were far 
more likely to reject low offers than were the preoccupied ones. In fact, of the 100 
offers in each group, there were 24 rejections in the first group and only 13 in the 
second. 
 
4.2. Regression Analysis 
Since there are two dimensions to attachment theory, it becomes natural to use 
regression analysis to separate the effects and test for their significance. To this 
extent, we ran OLS regressions to examine proposer behavior, and Logit regressions 
to examine responder behavior. The central explanatory variables are Anxiety and 
Avoidance, both continuous variables between 1 and 7. 
The fact that we have ten rounds of data for each individual raises some econometric 
issues. Since our explanatory variables include individual specific measures, we 
cannot use fixed effect or random effect variables to capture any missing variables at 
the individual level, since these variables would be perfectly correlated with the 
explanatory variables. Running a regression including all the data therefore leads to a 
situation in which observations are not independent. 
This issue is discussed at length in Botelho, et al. (2005), where a number of solutions 
are suggested which we adopt. First, we assume simply that there are no missing   16
explanatory variables and thus no problem, and use all the data in our regression. For 
proposers, for whom the measures of anxiety and avoidance are the only explanatory 
variables, this yields the same point estimates (but smaller standard errors) as using 
the average offer (this will not be true for responders, as presented below), and we 
therefore do not present this regression. Instead, we present the regression in which 
we use all the data and include fixed effects for each round rather than for each 
individual. This is appropriate if there is some type of round effect, such as learning. 
We also present the results of running the regression with a single observation per 
individual. We present the results when we use both the average proposal, and the 
results in the first round. In this manner observations are independent, but many data 
points are lost (90%). Finally, we run a Generalized Estimating Equation (GEE), 
which estimates the effects of variables that have no intra-panel variation, and uses 
population-averaged estimation methods.
3   
                                                  
3 Additional issues arise from the fact that the dependent variable can only take on certain values. 
Specifically, the proposal could only be in whole Shekels, and was limited to values between 0 and 50. 
Because the number of possibilities is so great, it is unlikely that this had an affect. To test whether this 
was indeed so, we ran interval censored regressions and Tobit regressions. As expected, the qualitative 
results did not change.   17
Table 1 
Offers by Proposer 
  OLS 
GEE    All Rounds  Average  First Round 






   19.74*** 
(4.29) 
















Second Round  -1.93 
(1.41) 
   
Third Round  -1.26 
(1.41) 
   
Fourth Round  -1.14 
(1.41) 
   
Fifth Round  -0.60 
(1.41) 
   
Sixth Round  -0.95 
(1.41) 
   
Seventh Round  -0.86 
(1.41) 
   
Eighth Round  0 
(1.41) 
   
Ninth Round  0.05 
(1.41) 
   
Tenth round  -2.07 
(1.41) 
   
N 420  42  42  420 
R
2  0.093 0.156  0.174   
Standard errors are in parentheses. 
*Significantly different from 0 at the 10% level. 
**Significantly different from 0 at the 5% level. 
***Significantly different from 0 at the 1% level. 
 
The results for proposers are presented in Table 1, and are quite similar across 
specifications. The size of the offer by the proposer is greater the more anxious and 
less avoidant he is. This result is consistent with the Hypotheses 1 and 3 above. Note 
that using the average offer must yield the same coefficients for anxiety and 
avoidance as running the regression on all the data with fixed effects. We include both 
simply because the standard errors differ. With respect to the fixed effects, the 
category left out was the first round. None of the fixed effects were significantly 
different from zero (i.e., no round was significantly different from round 1), though 
they are almost all negative, and, in fact, the average offer in the first round was 
higher than in most other rounds. It is interesting to note that the coefficient on   18
avoidance is not significant in the first period, although the point estimate is almost 
exactly the same as in later rounds. 
When considering the behavior of responders, an additional coefficient is required – 
the amount offered. Because of this we cannot use an average over all rounds, and we 
are still unable to include specific or random effects into the model for the reason 
raised above. In addition, there is little to be learned from looking at the first round 
alone since there were only three rejections in the first round (an offer of 5 and two 
offers of 10). We do include specific effects for round number. Since the dependent 
variable is binary (accept=1, reject=0), we use a logit regression specification. The 
















Avoidance  -0.12 
(0.19) 
            -0.13 
(0.19) 
Offer        0.21*** 
(0.02) 
      0.23*** 
(0.02) 
Second Round   -1.14 
(0.85) 
Third Round      -2.38** 
(0.82) 
Fourth Round          -2.93*** 
(0.82) 
Fifth Round         -2.19*** 
(0.82) 
Sixth Round   -1.78** 
(0.84) 
Seventh Round   -1.85** 
(0.84) 
Eight Round   -1.75** 
(0.85) 
Ninth Round   -1.59* 
(0.87) 
Tenth round   -1.56* 
(0.83) 
N 420  42 
Log likelihood
  169.84 158.7 
Pseudo R
2         0.23  0.28 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 
*Significantly different from 0 at the 10% level. 
**Significantly different from 0 at the 5% level. 
***Significantly different from 0 at the 1% level. 
  
Naturally, the most important explanatory variable is the amount offered – the more 
offered the higher the probability of acceptance. As per Hypothesis 2, higher anxiety 
individuals are more ready to accept low offers. Hypothesis 4, however, is not 
supported by the data; while the coefficient is of the right sign, it is not significantly 
different from 0. Interestingly, all of the round coefficients are negative and almost all 
are significant, i.e., the likelihood of rejection in the first round was higher than in 
later rounds. This seems to stem from two factors – first, as stated above, offers were 
higher in the first period than in later periods. Second, some very low bids were   20
accepted in the first period but rejected later on (an offer of 0, two offers of 5 and four 
offers of 10 were all accepted in period 1). 
    
4.3. Attachment Style and Optimal Proposals  
As shown in Roth, et al. (1991), given the behavior of responders, the optimal offer 
by proposers (the offer that maximizes the expected return) is well above zero, and, in 
fact, proposers (on average) behave optimally. In this section we will show that 
optimal proposer behavior depends on whom you are facing, and that if you know the 
attachment type of the person with whom you are dealing you can benefit by taking 
this information into account. This type of information could be quite useful in, say, 
negotiations (see, for instance, Eckel and Grossman, 2001). 
Following Roth et al. (1991), we examined what offers maximize the expected return 
for the proposers according to attachment type. To this end, we use the first 
specification in Table 2 to calculate the expected acceptance rate from each offer for 
each group as a function of the levels of anxiety and avoidance, and multiply this by 
the amount retained by the proposer to calculate the expected return from an offer. 
We then show how this expected return is affected by attachment type.  
Figure 10 
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In Figure 10 we take this comparison to the extreme by comparing persons with 
anxiety levels of 1 and 7 and attachment levels of 1 and 7.  The results are shown in 
Figure 10. As seen, the optimal offer depends on whom you are facing. The top half 
of Table 3 presents the optimal offers and the expected income from that offer.  
Table 3 
Proposer's Profit Maximizing Offers and Expected Income by Type of Responder 
Type Anxiety  Level  Avoidance  Level  Optimal Offer 
(out of 50)  Expected Income 
Extreme Preoccupied   7  1  13.37  32.03 
Extreme Fearful 
Avoidant  7 7  16.32  29.08 
Extreme Secure  1  1  19.89  25.52 
Extreme Dismissing 
Avoidant  1 7  22.74  22.67 
Average Preoccupied   4.84  2.89  16.67  28.74 
Average Fearful 
Avoidant   4.49 3.99  17.58  27.83 
Average Secure   2.97  2.84  18.66  26.74 
Average Dismissing 
Avoidant  3.13 4.03  19.07  26.34 
 
As can be seen in the graph and in the table, the attachment type of the responder can 
have a very substantial effect on optimal behavior and on the expected outcome. To 
take the extreme cases, when facing an extreme preoccupied individual it is best to 
offer only 13.37 NIS out of the 50 NIS allocated for division and one should expect 
an income of 32.03 NIS, while if facing an extreme dismissing avoidant individual the 
optimal offer is 22.74 and the expected income is 22.67.  Obviously one should be 
careful about taking this comparison to the extreme for two reasons: first, there are 
probably very few people whose behavior is that extreme, and second, because of the 
logit equation, there is a positive probability of rejecting even very generous offers. It 
is interesting to note that the expected income from bargains with the extreme 
dismissing avoidant individual is below 50% of the pie!   22
Figure 11 












































In Figure 11 we do a similar comparison for our population (see also the bottom half 
of Table 3), where, as before, we divide the subjects into four groups – above and 
below each of the medians of anxiety and avoidance. We use the average levels of 
anxiety and avoidance in each of the groups to again calculate the optimal offers and 
the expected incomes, and find that the order is unchanged, but the differences are 
significantly reduced when compared with extreme values. As discussed above, the 
groups we take are not indicative of Bowlby's actual categorization; but, it does allow 
comparison between different segments of our subject base. 
 
5. Discussion 
In this paper we considered the effect of the attachment style on individual economic 
behavior in the context of the Ultimatum Game. A number of significant effects of 
attachment style on behavior were uncovered.  
We found that if the proposers are anxiously attached, they offer higher shares of their 
endowment. As established by the psychological literature, the main goal of anxiously 
attached individuals is to get proximity and to be loved and appreciated. Therefore, as 
expected, anxiously attached proposers offer high shares to responders. In addition 
since the desire of anxiously attached individuals is to be loved and appreciated, they 
are very sensitive to "anti-goal" states (a situation that creates distress, such as being 
abandoned by a loved one). Since the game contains uncertainty, that is, the proposer 
does not know whether his offer will be accepted or not, they will offer high shares of   23
their endowment in order to avoid an anti-goal state of a rejection of their offer. As 
for anxiously attached responders, they show a tendency to accept more offers, again, 
in order to be appreciated.  
As for avoidant players, as proposers their offers were low, as expected. The main 
purpose of subjects who score high in avoidance is not to activate their attachment 
system in order not to feel that they are being exploited and used, feelings that lead to 
frustration. High offers create dependency on the behavior of the responder that may 
bear an emotional toll in case of a rejection. Avoidant individuals perceive rejection 
of high offers as a rejection of themselves. In contrast, low offers do not put the 
proposer in such a vulnerable position, because they can explain the rejection as 
resulting from the low offer. By making low offers, they protect themselves from 
getting hurt. The same is expected of avoidant responders, and while such a direction 
is observed, it was not found to be statistically significant.  
As discussed above, the essence of attachment theory deals with situations in which 
the parties are in close contact with one another. Thus, the anonymous setting in 
which Ultimatum Games are carried out works heavily against our hypotheses, and 
any findings should be viewed as lower bounds on expected effects in real-life 
settings. Clearly, if correct, our results suggest that knowledge of these behavioral 
implications could be useful in many strategic settings, particularly when one is able 
to discern the type of individual with whom one is dealing (as is the case when 
dealing with someone with whom you are close). We believe that attachment styles 
can predict behavior in other experimental, as well as real-world, settings. We leave it 
to future research to see if this is indeed the case.   24
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Appendix: Experiments in Close Relationships Scale (Brennan et al., 
1998; Mikulincer and Florian, 2000) 
 
Experience in Close Relationships Scale (ECR)  
 
The following statements concern how you generally feel in close relationships (e.g., 
with romantic partners, close friends, or family members).  Respond to each statement 
by indicating how much you agree or disagree with it.  Write the number in the space 












___   1. I prefer not to show others how I feel deep down. 
___   2. I worry about being rejected or abandoned. 
___   3. I am very comfortable being close to other people. 
___   4. I worry a lot about my relationships. 
___   5. Just when someone starts to get close to me I find myself pulling away. 
___   6. I worry that others won’t care about me as much as I care about them.  
___   7. I get uncomfortable when someone wants to be very close to me.  
___   8. I worry a fair amount about losing my close relationship partners.  
___   9. I don’t feel comfortable opening up to others.  
___ 10. I often wish that close relationship partners’ feelings for me were as strong as 
my feelings for them.  
___ 11. I want to get close to others, but I keep pulling back.  
___ 12. I want to get very close to others, and this sometimes scares them away.  
___ 13. I am nervous when another person gets too close to me.  
___ 14. I worry about being alone.  
___ 15. I feel comfortable sharing my private thoughts and feelings with others.  
___ 16. My desire to be very close sometimes scares people away.  
___ 17. I try to avoid getting too close to others.  
___ 18. I need a lot of reassurance that close relationship partners really care about 
me.  
___ 19. I find it relatively easy to get close to others.  
___ 20. Sometimes I feel that I try to force others to show more feeling, more 
commitment to our relationship than they otherwise would.  
___ 21. I find it difficult to allow myself to depend on close relationship partners.    27
___ 22. I do not often worry about being abandoned.  
___ 23. I prefer not to be too close to others.  
___ 24. If I can’t get a relationship partner to show interest in me, I get upset or angry.  
___ 25. I tell my close relationship partners just about everything.  
___ 26. I find that my partners don’t want to get as close as I would like.  
___ 27. I usually discuss my problems and concerns with close others.  
___ 28. When I don’t have close others around, I feel somewhat anxious and insecure.  
___ 29. I feel comfortable depending on others.  
___ 30. I get frustrated when my close relationship partners are not around as much as 
I would like.  
___ 31. I don’t mind asking close others for comfort, advice, or help.  
___ 32. I get frustrated if relationship partners are not available when I need them.  
___ 33. It helps to turn to close others in times of need.  
___ 34. When other people disapprove of me, I feel really bad about myself.  
___ 35. I turn to close relationship partners for many things, including comfort and 
reassurance.  
___ 36. I resent it when my relationship partners spend time away from me. 
 
 
   28
Figure 1 






LOW AVOIDANCE   
HIGH AVOIDANCE   
LOW 
ANXIETY   
HIGH 
ANXIETY   
SECURE    PREOCCUPIED   
DISMISSING 
AVOIDANT   
FEARFUL 
AVOIDANT   Electronic versions of the papers are available at 
http://www.biu.ac.il/soc/ec/wp/working_papers.html 
Bar-Ilan University 
Department of Economics 












5‐01  תידרחה הליהקהו ןודעומה לדומ    





















































































































































































































2009‐26  Remittances  and  the  Brain  Drain  Revisited:  The  Microdata  Show 
That More Educated Migrants Remit More 
Albert Bollard, David McKenzie, Melanie Morten and Hillel Rapoport, October 
2009. 
2009‐27  Implementability of Correlated and Communication Equilibrium 
Outcomes in Incomplete Information Games 
Igal Milchtaich, November 2009. 
2010‐01  The Ultimatum Game and Expected Utility Maximization‐In View of 
Attachment Theory 
Shaul Almakias and Avi Weiss, January 2010. 
2010‐02  A Model of Fault Allocation in Contract Law – Moving From Dividing 
Liability to Dividing Costs 
Osnat Jacobi and Avi Weiss, January 2010. 
 
 